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Abstract
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are permeating the critical infras-
tructures that our modern society relies on, and ICT security is becoming increasingly
important to all aspects of our lives. This dissertation presents security solutions from
domains such as telecommunication, oil & gas, and aviation, and shows by contrasting
with information about attacks and the threat of malware, that whereas a security
architecture is necessary for all security solutions, software security is becoming vital to
all types of development, not only security software.
This dissertation addresses the following research questions:
(i) How can handovers between wireless access points be performed se-
curely without incurring delays that affects VoIP user experience?
The secure handover scheme using Kerberos tickets (Paper 2, Paper 3) allows
for handover between 802.11 access points with a delay between 10 and 40 ms,
also when the mobile station has never encountered the destination access point
before.
(ii) How can security functions be organized in a critical infrastructure
network?
The dissertation presents a novel, simple, yet elegant scheme for asset identification
as part of the requirements elicitation process (Paper 4), and contrasts this with
a requirements process in the aviation domain (Paper 5). Furthermore, two
case studies demonstrating security architectures in two different domains are
presented (Paper 1, Paper 7). Finally, the difficulty of measuring the security of
software is discussed, emphasizing the importance of ensuring that the software
engineering process includes secure software engineering practices, and that the
level of adoption of such processes can be used to measure the secure software
engineering maturity of an organization (Paper 6).
(iii) How can a system survive a successful attack without alerting the
attacker?
The ISH system (Paper 9) represents a novel protection scheme where compromise
of a component can be detected by multiple mechanisms, and the compromised
component is removed from the system by being promoted to honeypot; achieving
the dual goal of both isolating the attacker and providing intelligence on the attack
to the defenders.
(iv) How can a successful attack on a critical infrastructure system be mit-
igated by incident handling?
The IRMA method (Paper 8) is based on sustained interaction with the Norwegian
oil & gas industry, and is tailored to this domain with a particular emphasis on
learning from security incidents to improve handling of future incidents.
(v) What is the threat posed by malware currently not detectable by
signature-based anti-malware systems?
The experiment reported in this dissertation (Paper 10) found that five computers
iv
with the latest version of various anti-malware software were infected by a total
of 124 unique malware samples after two weeks of agressive internet activity.
The dissertation discusses the challenges faced by security practitioners when con-
vincing customers and other stakeholders of the need for security, and highlights the
importance of making explicit tradeoffs between security on one hand, and cost, func-
tionality and user-friendliness on the other.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The last two decades has seen a steady creep of information technology into all kinds of
critical infrastructure. Computer communication has evolved into critical infrastruc-
ture all by itself, but power generation and distribution, oil & gas production, water
distribution and sewage all rely heavily on information technology.
This thesis is composed of a series of papers written over a period of eight years,
and documents results from a number of projects executed at SINTEF. The papers
are presented thematically, rather than chronologically. Most of my work at SINTEF
has been performed in cooperation with my colleagues, students1 or international
collaborators, and I have therefore in most places found it more natural to use the “we”
form when a personal pronoun is required.
The first three papers originate from the EU FP6 research project OBAN, which
ventured to provide a solution that would allow mobile users to use spare capacity from
private WLAN access points as a high-bandwidth alternative to GPRS or UMTS data.
SINTEF assumed responsibility of the security activity in the architecture work package
of OBAN, and this resulted in a security architecture for the OBAN concept [41] (see
page 37) and a novel mechanism for ensuring security for fast handovers between access
points [44] (page 57). The final results of the OBAN project were summarised in a
journal article [66] (page 73).
The next three papers are broadly in the area of software security, first describing
a method to identify assets before eliciting security requirements [40](page 85), then
documenting security requirements in an aviation application [29] (page 97), and finally
delving into the thorny issue of measurement of (software) security. [25](page 109).
The next paper builds partly on the experience from the security architecture of OBAN,
by specifying a security architecture for secure remote access to Safety Instrumented
Systems in the oil & gas domain [34] (page 121). This effort is then supported by a
framework for incident response management in the same domain [26] (page 141).
The penultimate paper builds on an idea conceived during my time at the Norwegian
Defence Research Institute (FFI) [31]. This paper [35] (page 157) describes a prototype
system for survivability of web-facing servers through duplication, and additionally a
dynamic creation of a honeypot in cases where a single component is compromised
1some of which have in turn become my colleagues
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by an attacker. The last paper [33] (page 175) reports on an experiment testing the
efficacy of anti-malware software against new malware, providing empirical figures with
respect to the number of malware instances a user may be exposed to in the window
of opportunity between when a new malware instance is created and when updated
malware signatures are available.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides some background information useful for understanding the papers
summarized in Chapter 3.
1 The Kerberos Network Authentication System
Two of the papers in this thesis rely heavily on the Kerberos authentication system, and
I therefore take the opportunity to provide a detailed explanation of Kerberos, based
on a series of lectures I held using Stallings’ “Cryptography and Network Security” [74]
as textbook, and an article I co-authored for Telektronikk [42] .
Kerberos [59] is an authentication protocol developed at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) originally to protect their own network services. Variants of Kerberos
have since then been used as authentication protocol in several products, including
Microsoft Windows.
In the past, I’ve found that Kerberos can be quite difficult to understand for those
encountering it for the first time. The following approach has proved fairly successful in
explaining the concept.
1.1 An Allegorical Description
Let’s cast our imagination back to medieval times, and imagine sending an envoy from
the King of Norway to the Emperor of China. This was before RFID passports, and
indeed any form of image-based identification, so the envoy needs some other way of
proving to the emperor that he is not an impostor. A Kerberos ticket can be viewed
as a sort of sealed letter of reference containing a secret password. It is assumed that
the recipient (the Emperor) can recognize the King’s seal, and that it is not possible to
open the envelope without breaking the seal (and the seal cannot be forged). When the
King hands the “ticket” over to his envoy, he simultaneously informs him of the secret
password within (e.g., “42”).
Upon reaching his destination, the bearer of the ticket (i.e., letter of reference) presents
the sealed envelope to the Emperor, who breaks the seal and extracts the contents. The
Emperor then asks the bearer about the secret inside the letter (“What is the answer
3
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Figure 2.1: A ticket as a sealed letter of reference
to life, the universe, and everything?”). When the envoy responds correctly (“42”), the
Emperor can be satisfied that this is indeed the King’s trusted servant.
Note that there is one important difference between this allegorical example and a
real Kerberos ticket: The letter cannot be opened without breaking the seal, while the
Kerberos ticket cannot be “opened” by a third party (or the envoy) at all (we assume
that the cryptography is strong enough to make opening “impossible” if one doesn’t
possess the correct key). If the cryptography can be broken, however, this would have
been done without detection, and the whole system would break.
1.2 A Step Closer to the Real World
In a Kerberos ticket, the secret password is a session key (which we in the following will
refer to as access key, in order to avoid confusing it with the session key for encrypting
the wireless connection), and the seal is realized by encryption with a key shared between
the King (or, Authentication Server - AS) and the Emperor (or, Ticket Granting Server
- TGS). To complicate matters, there is a third party involved as well, i.e. the server
(“V”) that provides the specific application service (mail, file transfer, etc.), but for the
time being we will ignore this.
The task of the AS is to authenticate the client (done implicitly by issuing data
encrypted with the client’s password), and issue a Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT) that
4
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Figure 2.2: Simplified illustration of ticket and accompanying information
the client will use when authenticating to the TGS. The task of the TGS is to issue a
ticket for the specific service that the client wants, as can be seen in Figure 2.4.
When the envoy (or Client - C) initially requests a ticket, it needs a pre-shared secret
with the AS, normally in the form of a password. This secret (the green key in Figure
2.2) is used to protect the dynamic access key (chosen by AS) that is also embedded in
the ticket. Thus, the ticket in itself is worthless if the bearer cannot prove that it also
knows the access key. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the client C receives two elements
from the AS:
• The ticket (which the client cannot decrypt)
• The accompanying information, including (most importantly) the access key (this
is encrypted with the shared secret that C and AS possess).
The ticket is used to create a dynamic (indirect) trust relation between C and TGS,
based on the fact that there are static (direct) trust relationships in the form of shared
secrets between AS and C (green key) and between AS and TGS (blue key). This is
illustrated in Figure 2.3.
When finally the service granting server (V) enters the picture, the interactions
previously performed toward AS are basically repeated toward TGS, with similar trust
relations (except that the direct trust relation between C and AS is replaced with the
indirect (dynamic) trust relation between C and TGS). Thus, if we disregard whether
trust relations are direct or indirect, we can replace AS by TGS and TGS by V (i.e.
serVice granting server) in Figure 2.3. The “full picture” can be seen in Figure 2.4
(adapted from Stallings [74]).
For completeness, Figure 2.5 gives a more detailed explanation of the messages sent
from AS to C after initial authentication. This is thus how the client receives the
ticket-granting-ticket; the messages when transferring the service-granting-ticket are
completely analogous.
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Figure 2.3: Trust relations and shared keys
Authentication 
Server (AS) 
Ticket- 
granting 
Server (TGS) 
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User 
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Figure 2.4: Kerberos overview (adapted from Stallings [74])
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Figure 2.5: Detailed explanation of initial messages between AS and C
2 Integrated Operations
The Norwegian oil industry is responsible for the greater part of the Norwegian gross
national product, but since all production facilities are on offshore oil platforms, it is
generally dangerous and expensive work. For many years, there has therefore been a
push from the industry to increase the level of remote operations, with less reliance
on having people flying offshore; if not eliminating humans from the equation, than at
least reducing the numbers. This concept has been called “Integrated Operations”, and
makes heavy use of online collaboration tools, videoconferencing and other ICT.
Integrated operations also implies that previously isolated process control networks
increasingly are being interconnected; and operators, contractors, and service companies
communicate directly using computer networks. Although the Norwegian Oil Industry
Association (OLF) has tried to avoid having Integrated Operations being perceived as
a synonym for remote operations1, it is clear that this is major aspect. In the short
term, IO reduces the need for onshore experts to make short-term visits to offshore
installations to perform ad-hoc problem solving. This is due to the aforementioned
online collaboration tools, allowing many problems to be solved collaboratively, with
any necessary manual tasks performed by the offshore personnel already on site.
3 System Safety, Safety Integrity Levels and Safety
Instrumented Systems
The terms Safety and Security refer to related, but quite different concepts. It is
therefore interesting to note that in Germanic languages such as Norwegian, there is
just a single word (“Sikkerhet”) to cover both concepts. This is a constant source of
misunderstandings, and can sometimes lead to controversy [52]; two parties may seem
to agree that security is very important, but later it will turn out that one of them is
only concerned about safety.
There have been many cases in the past [29, 11] where safety experts have tried to
1This is likely due to political considerations, since offshore labor unions see remote operations as a
potential threat to their paycheck and/or a precursor to offshore job cutbacks.
7
4. MALWARE CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
apply safety methodologies to security problems, with disappointing results. While a
safety analysis will try to calculate, e.g., a system-wide probability of failure, it is not
possible to calculate a probability of attack in the same manner. Consequently, it is not
possible to calculate a ”Mean Time To Attack”.
Safety in process control environments has always been very important, and inter-
national standards [68, 4, 5] detail how to design and evaluate safety-related systems
(see Figure 2.6). Systems are classified into 4 Safety Integrity Levels (SIL), where a
higher SIL indicates a higher reliability of the safety functions. Another way of putting
this is that a higher SIL indicates a higher probability that all required safety functions
will perform as required when needed. Safety Integrity Levels are thus dependent on
the risks that a given system is subject to, and say something about the required risk
reductions offered by the safety systems.
The process industry has created its own standard for development and assessment
of Safety Instrumented Systems [5]. Even more specifically, the Norwegian Oil Industry
Association (formerly OLF, now Norsk Olje & Gass) published a guideline for applying
IEC 61508 and 61511 in the Norwegian Petroleum Industry [1]. Safety systems are
based on concepts such as “Mean Time to Failure”, allowing individual components to
be replaced before they statistically would be expected to fail. An offshore installation
represents a substantial investment, and typically the life cycle for process control
equipment is significantly longer than for comparable office systems. From a safety
perspective, this is not a problem as long as components that may fail are replaced
regularly; from a security perspective, however, it often implies that systems with
security flaws are kept in service long after the flaws have become common knowledge.
Strangely, whereas information security professionals might feel more secure when
using systems that are certified for a high security level, safety professionals can get
uneasy when relying on a system certified for a high Safety Integrity Level. The reason
for this apparent contradiction is that a system with a high SIL relies more extensively
on the safety system, and in one sense less able to tolerate an eventual loss of this system
- if things go wrong, they go spectacularly so. This also implies that any information
security flaws will have a higher impact on a system with a high SIL [21].
4 Malware
Malware can be described as software written with malicious intent2, or alternatively
computer code which exhibits malign or harmful behavior or effects. Examples of
malware include viruses, worms, trojans, and rootkits.
The first academic treatment of computer viruses was performed by Cohen [12], and
while he also claims to have created the first virus as an experiment in November 1983,
we have from other sources that the Elk Cloner virus for the Apple II computer was
written in 1982 [51]. The first virus for the IBM PC, the globally propagated Brain
computer virus, originated from Pakistan in 1986 [72, 23]. Although the motivation is a
2Sometimes, the popular press will use the term “malicious software”, but this would imply that the
software is somehow sentient and capable of having independent intentions, which is clearly not the
case.
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Figure 2.6: The safety cycle as illustrated in IEC 61508
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bit unclear, Brain was ostensibly developed as a copy-protection measure by a Lahore
software firm. The first generation of viruses spread via floppy diskettes, either infecting
the boot sectors of connected hard disks or diskettes, or individual programs on the
target machine. It is fair to say that software piracy was a major contributing factor to
the spreading of these viruses, since games would be copied and distributed manually
from person to person, and the viruses would be silently copied along with them.
Whereas viruses first were the province of personal computers such as the IBM PC
and the Amiga, computer worms started their life on multiuser platforms such as UNIX
[65]. When personal computers began to get connected to the internet in the late
1990-ies, hybrid malware that exhibited both virus and worm characteristics began
to appear. While some academics tried to differentiate between viruses and worms
by stating that the former required active user interaction, this distinction eventually
became less useful, and today most security professionals are content to use the generic
term malware.
Many malware instances spread quickly and prolifically because they exploited widely
un-patched vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Windows operating system. In particular,
the SASSER worm saw such a wide distribution in 2003 that it was impossible to install
Windows 2000 on a computer while it was connected to the internet – the computer
would be infected and rendered useless before the installation process could even be
completed3.
After the turn of the millennium, there was also a shift in focus of most malware
– previously, it seemed that the main purpose of malware was destruction of data or
performing more innocent pranks, but now increasingly malware would create back
doors on infected systems, enlisting them in so-called bot-nets [80] which in turn could
be used to perform distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against web servers and
other systems. Often, this would be part of blackmail schemes, where botnet controllers
would extort money from system owners under threat of having their system made
unavailable due to DDoS. There have also been examples of so-called ransomware, where
the malware would encrypt files on the victim’s computer, and then demand payment
to deliver the encryption key (this form of malware has recently seen an upswing in
popularity).
In recent years there have been examples of malware allegedly being used by nation
states as part of intelligence or intervention operations. The most famous example is
Stuxnet [17], which allegedly caused the physical destruction of nuclear centrifuges at
the Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant, thus hampering the Iranian nuclear weapons
program. More recent examples such as Duqu and Flame [18] have been identified as
information gatherers focused on strategic technology. The important thing to note here
is that malware can be (and has been) used for targeted attacks at critical infrastructure
systems, and that this threat cannot be discounted [54].
3Personal experience by the author.
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Chapter 3
CII Security
This chapter describes the ten papers included in this thesis. They are grouped
thematically; papers 1, 2 and 3 are about security in open broadband access networks,
papers 4, 5 and 6 are about software security, papers 7 and 8 are about security in
offshore process control environments, while papers 9 and 10 are about (resistance to)
remote attacks and malware.
1 Research Questions
Unlike a traditional PhD thesis, this work did not start out by first drafting a number
of research questions and then subsequently seeking the answers to these questions.
However, having co-supervised (formally and informally) a number of PhD students,
I realize that this is also generally not true for traditional PhD students – even when
the research questions are posed at the onset, they change significantly during the PhD
trajectory, and usually end up having to be tailored to the work actually performed,
rather than to the work that originally was intended.
With this in mind, we can present the following research questions:
(i) How can handovers between wireless access points be performed securely without
incurring delays that affects VoIP user experience?
(ii) How can security functions be organized in a critical infrastructure network?
(iii) How can a system survive a successful attack without alerting the attacker?
(iv) How can a successful attack on a critical infrastructure system be mitigated by
incident handling?
(v) What is the threat posed by malware currently not detectable by signature-based
anti-malware systems?
The way the papers relate to each other and to the research questions is illustrated
in Figure 3.1. The figure is mostly self-explanatory, but the following connections might
need some extra explanation:
11
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Paper 1: Security Architecture 
Paper 2: Fast Handover 
Paper 3: OBAN 
Paper 7 
Secure Safety 
Paper 8 
Incident 
Response 
Paper 9 
Survivability 
Paper 10 
Malware 
Security in Process Control 
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RQ1 
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Paper 6 
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RQ2 
RQ2 
RQ2 
Software Security 
Figure 3.1: Connection between papers
• Paper 1 was our first foray into the area of security requirements, which eventually
led us to explore the field of software security and asset identification (paper 4),
and security architecture of critical infrastructure systems (paper 7)
• Paper 7 explored the interplay between security and safety, which proved relevant
for Paper 5
• Measurement of security (paper 6) is relevant for survivability of a software system
(paper 9) (although this link is implicit; hence the dashed line)
2 Open Broadband Networks
Every day, additional households all over the world are getting a broadband connection
to the internet; the OECD average currently exceeds 25 broadband connections per
100 inhabitants [64]. These connections are however typically not used with a constant
intensity during the course of a day; on weekdays, most residential broadband connections
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Figure 3.2: Handover candidates per Mobility Broker
are idle when their owners are at work or at school, and the same is true during vacations.
This implies that there is a lot of untapped bandwidth1 that could have been put to
good use for others. This was the idea behind the Open Broadband Access Network
(OBAN) project (Paper 1-3 [41, 44, 66]), which sought to make excess capacity from
personal wireless access points available to passing strangers.
The business case of OBAN was to integrate the personal access points in the
roaming hierarchy of mobile telephone operators, allowing subscribers to utilize the
high capacity of a wireless access point when available, and hand over to the regular
cellular infrastructure when moving out of range. This means tying the use of an access
point to a mobile subscription, and also allows for introducing different incentives for
the home subscribers for opening up their networks, e.g., reduced subscription cost or
increased bandwidth for the same price.
Opening up a private access point to the general public requires a proper security
architecture [41]. However, one of the quality-of-service requirements of OBAN was to
support seamless handovers for a pedestrian user in urban areas. This proved to be
a challenge when performing handovers between two private access points that don’t
even know about each other, much less have a pre-existing trust relationship. Early
trials showed that if roaming users would have to perform an authentication with the
provider’s back-end systems, the introduced delay would have exceeded the target of 50
ms, which means that, e.g., Voice over IP (VoIP) users would have experienced quality
degradation during handover.
1Bandwidth is here used in the conventional meaning of “capacity”, although some claim it should
be reserved for discussions involving a frequency spectrum.
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The solution [44] was to exploit the fact that since all access points would have a
trust relationship with the Internet Service Provider (ISP), it should be possible to
pre-authenticate to all of the surrounding access points (and thus potential handover
candidates) before the handover takes place. This requires that the user spends a certain
minimum of time at each access point before performing a handover, but since the target
group was pedestrian users, this requirement was not deemed to represent a problem.
The actual authentication method selected was to use Kerberos tickets which could be
evaluated locally on each access point.
However, since in any given residential area there may be more than one ISP, it may
be unnecessarily restrictive and inefficient to only enable handovers between access
points belonging to the same ISP. In OBAN, it was therefore decided to introduce a
new geographically defined entity; the Mobility Broker (MB). All participating access
points would need to establish a trust relationship with the MB in their area; this
would typically be done at time of installation. The MB would in turn have a trust
relationship with all participating ISPs.
Using Kerberos-style tickets is feasible since the MB’s trust relationship with every
access point means that there is a possibility of establishing a shared secret between
the MB and any given access point. This shared secret can be the encryption key used
to encrypt the “service ticket” which is issued to the mobile user, and which in turn
contains the session key that is used to authenticate and establish a secure connection
with the mobile user during the handover.
It is important to note that the mobile user will try to acquire Kerberos tickets to
all potential handover candidates before it becomes necessary to perform the actual
handover. The task of determining which access points are likely candidates is left to
the Mobility Broker, and in some cases it might be feasible for the MB to issue the
14
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Figure 3.4: Brainstorming with Sticky Notes
mobile user with tickets for all the access points in its area. In any case, it is only
necessary for the mobile user to perform one full authentication toward its home ISP
prior to acquiring handover tickets, as illustrated in Figure 3.3.
3 Software Security
Secure systems are not simply collections of security features, but also require that
all the implemented features are secure. This implies that not only does care need
to be taken when coding critical infrastructure applications, but in the early stages
of development it is important to identify the assets that are to be protected before
security requirements are elicited.
We found that identification off assets is something that most secure software method-
ologies mentioned as an important first step, but none of them provided any information
on exactly how this should be done. Inspired by brainstorming techniques as described
by Dyb˚a et al. [15], we formalized in Paper 4 [40] a step-by-step process for identifying
and prioritizing assets.
First, a group of stakeholders with detailed knowledge of the system to be built (or
analyzed) are assembled in a room, led by a moderator. There are no firm limits with
respect to the number of attendees, but we found that it works best with 8 stakeholders
or less. Technical experts and actual users are generally more useful than managers
15
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Table 3.1: Asset prioritization table
ASSETS STAKEHOLDERS’ PRIORITY
Focus: protection
What is most important to protect
from stakeholders’ point of view?
Focus: attacks
What is most in-
teresting or valu-
able for an at-
tacker?
Description System user System owner Attacker
<asset 1> <C-? I-? A-?> <C-? I-? A-?> <C-? I-? A-?>
<asset 2> <C-? I-? A-?> <C-? I-? A-?> <C-? I-? A-?>
... ... ... ...
in this phase, and the latter should be avoided if they are likely to put a damper on
creativity. The stakeholders are then given pads of sticky notes, and asked to write
down all assets they can think of in the system at hand. This continues as long as
anyone can think of new assets to write down; when activity tapers off, the process
leader announces that this phase will continue two minutes more (up to the discretion
of the moderator).
The next phase starts with the moderator asking each stakeholder in turn to put
(say) five notes up on the wall (e.g., a whiteboard) as illustrated in Figure 3.4. This
continues in a round robin fashion until all notes are up on the wall. Stakeholders are
encouraged to write new notes during this process, if spurred on by other stakeholders’
ideas. They can also group notes that are duplicates or related to each other.
When all the notes are up on the board, the moderator can assist with further grouping
if necessary. The stakeholders are then asked to rank the importance of confidentiality,
integrity and availability of each asset using a qualitative scale of High-Medium-Low,
and to do this from three perspectives: the user (or customer), the owner of the system
(or developer), and the attacker. This usually requires some discussion among the
stakeholders until consensus is reached. The end result is then filled into a table as
exemplified in Table 3.1. The final priority for an asset can be calculated by assigning
values to the qualitative scale, and summing up the values across the table. In our
original method [40], we assigned the value 1 to “High”, 2 to “Medium” and 3 to “Low”,
and 4 to any values not entered, thus giving the lowest resulting value the highest
priority. In later work [32], we reconsidered this, flipping the scale with a 0 for no value,
1 for “Low” etc. We also decided that summing up the CIA values did not make sense,
and instead calculated individual priorities for confidentiality, integrity and availability
for each asset.
Having identified the assets, the next step is to elicit security requirements to protect
these assets. As an example of this, we can take the security requirements we elicited
for the aviation System Wide Information Management (SWIM) system (Paper 5
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[29]). In this case, the primary assets (information and services) and secondary assets
(hardware and infrastructure) were defined in a complex process involving both numerous
stakeholders and multiple development organizations.
SWIM is introduced as a replacement to the traditional point-to-point communica-
tions in aviation (see Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6), ensuring that information such as
flight trajectory and meteorological data can be shared by a large number of actors in-
cluding pilots, Air Navigation Service Providers and Airport Operation Centres. SWIM
provides a unified interface to aviation information, supporting more efficient Air Traffic
Management.
Figure 3.5: Aviation communication before SWIM
Figure 3.6: Aviation communication after SWIM
Once a piece of software has been written, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to
measure how secure it is, and equally difficult to compare two programs to determine
whether one is more secure than the other. This is the problem tackled by Paper 6 [40],
which looks at various approaches to software security metrics before concluding that
the most promising currently is the Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM).
Instead of trying to measure the security of the software that is developed, BSIMM
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Table 3.2: The BSIMM Software Security Framework
Governance Intelligence SSDL
Touch-
points
Deployment
Strategy and
Metrics
Attack Models Architecture
Analysis
Penetration Test-
ing
Compliance
and Policy
Security
Features and
Design
Code Review Software Envi-
ronment
Training Standards and
Requirements
Security Test-
ing
Configuration
Management
and Vulnerabil-
ity Management
measures second-order effects, i.e., which activities a development organization performs
when developing (secure) software.
BSIMM presents a software security framework consisting of 12 practices organized in
four domains (see Table 3.2). Each practice contains a number of activities categorized
in three maturity levels, where the assumption is that the activities on the first level
should be covered before activities on the higher levels should be approached. However,
BSIMM claims to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, implying that it should be used
for measurement rather than a standard to aspire to. Having said this, it is nonetheless
evident that if organizations perceived as software security leaders are implementing a
set of activities from the BSIMM Software Security Framework, this will be a strong
incentive for other organizations to do the same.
Thus far, BSIMM has mainly been used as measurement tool by Digital (the company
that initiated BSIMM), and as a self-assessment tool. It remains to be seen if it can
also be used as a research tool, or if the personal qualities of Cigital’s “BSIMM auditors”
are too specialized to be reproduced by random scientists.
4 Security in Safety-Critical Environments
The Norwegian offshore oil & gas industry is embracing the Integrated Operations (IO)
concept, which means that it experiences an increased reliance on information and
communications technology. This in turn means that greater efforts have to be expended
on building more secure systems, but also that contingency measures such as frameworks
for information security incident response management have to be developed.
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4.1 Secure Safety
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) are tasked with ensuring the safety of process control
environments, and it is therefore imperative that an outside attacker be prevented
from interfering with them. The introduction of Integrated Operations (IO) on the
Norwegian continental shelf implies that process control networks increasingly are being
interconnected.
The Secure Safety (SeSa) project (Paper 7 [34]) ventured to specify a layered security
architecture based on the principle of defense in depth, taking into account the various
safety levels with associated required integrity. It should be noted here that in the
context of safety, integrity of systems is the over-arching concern; confidentiality may
be needed for other reasons, but was considered out of scope for SeSa. Furthermore,
availability of service is normally not a safety concern, since a system that is doing
nothing generally does not pose a safety hazard. The obvious exception to this rule is
the SIS itself, which if unavailable would not be able to intervene when necessary.
One challenge with the way offshore oil platforms are operated in the North Sea
is that the operating organization typically isn’t self-sufficient, meaning that specific
equipment is owned and operated by external contractors. This also implies that these
external contractors sometimes need remote access to their equipment for maintenance
purposes. The security zones illustrated in Figure 3.7 was our approach to handle this.
As the figure illustrates, contractors accessing the process control network from a secure
location would be allowed in, but other connection attempts would be rejected. No
direct access would be allowed from the outside to SAS or SIS, but we specified an
“information diode” functionality that could mirror content from the SAS history server
to a duplicate server in the inner DMZ. This would allow, e.g., contractors read-only
access to information for monitoring purposes.
The SeSa method, in addition to specifying a recommended network architecture,
also provides a scheme for determining whether a solution will achieve the desired Safety
Integrity Level (SIL).
4.2 Incident Response Management
Acknowledging that 100% security in practice is unattainable [71], it is prudent to plan
and prepare for situations where information security incidents have occurred and need
to be handled.
Since process control systems historically were isolated networks with no external
connections, general consensus in the process control community seemed to be that this
was a non-issue2, and some have reportedly claimed that they do not have ICT systems
– “we only have programmable logic.”. However, during the IRMA project (Paper 8 [26])
it quickly became clear that incidents of various stripe did and do happen – in group
interviews and workshop sessions, representatives from the same company would relate
different incidents that the others were not aware of. We also experienced that routines
or procedures that were identified as missing during one workshop suddenly would be
available the next – we interpret this as an example of a learning organization.
2Although the Stuxnet example shows that even an air gap is no guarantee against outside attack.
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Figure 3.7: Security zones at operators and contractors
We started our work with an incident response management methodology by leaning
heavily on established work such as the ISO technical report on incident management
[2] (later to be superseded by an international standard [3]) and the NIST incident
handling guide [20]. The ISO approach is organized around Deming’s Plan-Do-Check-
Act circle [15], but since we wanted to highlight the amount of effort expended on each
type of activity, we decided to make our own cycle composed of three phases: Prepare,
Detect & recover, and Learn (see Figure 3.8). Note that the Prepare phase in the figure
is twice as big as the two others; this is meant to illustrate that most of the time, the
organization will be in the prepare phase - it will only leave the prepare phase once
an incident has been detected, illustrated by the exploding bomb. After the incident
has been contained, and operations restored to normal, it is important to spend (at
least) the same amount of effort on learning from the incident. This learning then feeds
back into the Prepare phase, hopefully avoiding a similar incident another time. The
Prepare phase will of course also be affected by external influences such as new security
technology, knowledge exchange with other organizations and sectors, and changing
threat picture.
5 Survivability and Malware
It has been said that the only 100% secure computer system is one that is turned off and
locked in a safe3. Whereas this may seem a bit extreme, it does demonstrate that very
3paraphrased from a quote by Gene Spafford http://spaf.cerias.purdue.edu/quotes.html
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Figure 3.8: The Incident Response Management Cycle
often, real life forces us to make a trade-off between usability and security. This, in turn,
implies that systems that we find useful inevitably have security flaws. Acknowledging
this, we sketched [31] some ideas on how a commodity operating system could become
more survivable. These ideas were then taken further at SINTEF, and a prototype
of the “Increasing Survivability by dynamic deployment of Honeypots” (ISH) system
produced (Paper 9 [35]).
The general idea behind ISH is to provide an internet-facing web server that is not
vulnerable to application-specific or platform-specific exploits. This is done by having
a very simple proxy replicating all incoming web requests, and distributing these to a
number4 of functionally equivalent, but different web servers. Each request is processed
by each server, and the result compared. If all results match, this result is returned
to the requesting client. If the results differ, a majority vote is used to determine
what should be returned. In this case, the minority is considered suspect, and may be
removed from further processing.
The premise is that well-formed requests should produce well-formed responses, as
long as the web server faithfully follows the HTTP and HTML standards. Non-well-
formed requests, that try to exploit implementation flaws in application or operating
system, are likely to produce implementation-dependent results. In particular, this
would often be true of an exploit which is successfully executed.
However, it cannot be guaranteed that all successful exploits will generate a difference
in output that can be detected by the voters, and thus the ISH prototype also provided
4The prototype system implemented three servers.
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Figure 3.9: Main idea sketch of the ISH system
another level of security: Each web server did not have its own file system, but instead
mounted a network file system from a special-purpose file server (one file server per
web server). These file servers also performed regular malware scans on the exported
volumes; these scans were in effect off-line scans, in that the server performing the scans
demonstrably did not run any software present on the exported volume. This counters
any stealth effects that a rootkit might have effectuated on the web server.
Now, if a compromised web server is detected, either due to a voter mismatch or
a detected malware specimen, the ISH prototype facilitates an additional intelligence
gathering function. Instead of shutting down a compromised server, it is instead excluded
from further voting operations, and separated logically from the other servers. The
existing connections that are determined to originate from an attacker are allowed to
continue, but the available data on the server is quickly exchanged with bogus data
which would be of no use to the attacker. The compromised server is thus converted to
a Honeypot, allowing administrators to monitor the attackers, possibly learning more
about their motives and future targets. Not only will this facilitate the possibility of
early warning to other sites, but also slows the attackers down by making them waste
their time on a system that will not provide them with any useful data.
The necessity of finding new ways to combat attackers and malware is illustrated by
the final paper in this thesis (Paper 10 [33]), which reports on an experiment that was
designed to collect some real-life data about the gap that exists between when a piece
of malware is available in the wild, and when updated virus signatures for that malware
is available.
We installed fresh copies of Microsoft Windows XP on five PCs, applied the latest
service packs, and installed anti-spyware and different anti-malware products on each
machine. We then embarked on two weeks of high-risk internet behavior; visiting
download sites with (possibly) pirated software, participated in file sharing networks,
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downloaded music and videos, and more. Furthermore, like an enthusiastic but na¨ıve
internet user, we clicked “yes” or similar on all pop-ups that appeared, and installed
any missing plugins or codecs that were suggested by the software we installed.
After this active period, the five machines were shut down for one month. Subsequently,
the machines were subjected to off-line scans using updated anti-malware signatures.
Even though the installed anti-malware had detected numerous instances during the
two-week period, this new scan demonstrated that at total of 124 unique malware
specimens had infected our machines without detection. It is thus clear that users
exhibiting risky behavior cannot rely on current anti-malware products for protection.
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Chapter 4
Discussion
In the previous sections, I have presented a number of security solutions for various
areas. However, in many cases the main challenge is not developing a working security
solution, but rather convincing businesses and individuals that they need it. In the
following I will discuss the following recurring sentiments:
• We don’t need security
• Everyone wants security, but nobody wants to pay for it
• We Cannot Afford Security
I will then dwell on the fact that security is a process, rather than a thing, and round
off with a discussion on the challenges of empirical research in the security domain.
1 We Don’t Need Security
Security and privacy are concepts that are even more related than security and safety,
but they are not synonymous. The classic decomposition of security into Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability makes it tempting to conclude that privacy has nothing to
do with the latter two, and thus should somehow be related to Confidentiality. The
distinction between privacy and confidentiality can be subtle, since it is certainly true
that privacy can be ensured through judicious application of confidentiality, but since
real-life situations typically require us to exchange various types of personal information
with other entities, confidentiality alone can never be sufficient.
In particular with respect to privacy, but also when it comes to security in general,
individuals sometimes adopt the stance that “I have nothing to hide, so why should
I worry about privacy?”. In general security, this translates into “Who would want
to steal my information?”, with variants along the lines of “Our systems are so highly
specialized that no outsiders have the required information to exploit them.” These are
all misconceptions rooted in insufficient knowledge, and in many of our projects in the
oil and gas industry we have found ourself edging into a role as educators or awareness
raisers.
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The flip side of the privacy issue is that many users will claim to be concerned
with privacy, but at the first decision point where they are forced to choose between
functionality and privacy, they will choose functionality [37]. This is the reason why
so many people use services like Facebook and LinkedIn, in spite of their sometimes
questionable privacy policies, and why Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) have
such a hard time penetrating the market [37].
Another mental trap that organizations may fall prey to is to assume that a low
number of incidents implies a satisfactory security posture. In our interaction with the
oil industry, we have several times spun tales with potential scenarios that only a few
years later emerged as a reality. Any industry that involves such vasts amount of money
as in the energy sector must expect to be the target of future attacks.
Particularly when it comes to software security [32], security is necessary also in
components that in themselves do not appear to be security-related. The classical
example of this is the vulnerability in Adobe’s Acrobat Reader, where a malformed
PDF document could give an attacker remote access to a victim computer [58]. Nothing
could be more innocuous than a program that does nothing more than display PDF
files, but a PDF file received in an email or downloaded from the internet has unknown
provenance, and represents an opportunity for an attacker to sneak malign code through
our defenses.
2 Everyone Wants Security, but Nobody Wants to
Pay for It
Security is never free. Even when not paying in purely monetary sense, users of security
always need to accept that things take longer time, are less convenient, or are less exiting
than they would otherwise be. A case in point is the recent uproar over the discovery
of bogus GSM base stations (also know as IMSI catchers) in various strategic locations
in Oslo [13], allegedly allowing tracking of and eavesdropping on top politicians and
business executives. Numerous public figures were quickly demanding that “something
be done”, but ignored the fact that the UMTS system already has solved the biggest
problems of GSM (no mutual authentication; weak encryption algorithms [43]), and
switching to equipment that only uses UMTS, refusing to fall back to GSM, would
directly address the threat of these fake base stations. However, that would also mean
that this equipment would lose coverage as soon as the owner moves out of urban areas,
which might not seem attractive to (e.g.) important businessmen. Thus, even though
many people are willing to pay for security technology, they are often not willing to
sacrifice the extra functionality or ease of use that added security would imply.
Improved usability of security technology is thus clearly an important topic, but user
awareness may be even more important, at least in the short run. Everyone cannot be
trained to be a security expert, but maybe it will be possible to teach everyone enough
to know when they need to call one.
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3 We Cannot Afford Security
In many cases, security is seen as an added cost. A security manager trying to ensure
upper management support for investing in security measures needs to argue for a positive
Return On Investment (ROI). This becomes difficult in the absence of security incidents
– it could appear that the security investment was excessive or wasted. Strangely, this is
very seldom an issue in the safety field, but can be explained by society’s willingness to
spend a lot of money if it can save the life of even one human being.
As security professionals, our challenge is to instead present security as an enabler,
rather than a pure cost. There are some examples where security incidents have caused
a renewed focus in information security; in 2001 the US Department of the Interior
was disconnected from the internet by a court order, due to a lawsuit stemming from
a security incident [63]. This caused a complete revamping of the internal security
practices of this government department.
A related variant is “we cannot afford to wait for security”, which often is manifested
in statements such as “we first need to get the functionality up and running; then we
can worry about the security”. This results in “bolt-on” rather than “built-in” security,
which implies that any fundamental architectural security flaws are not caught early
on in the development process (if at all), causing a final product that either contains
security flaws (when flaws are not caught) or is significantly more expensive (when the
flaws are caught, requiring a redesign) [32].
Even in cases where there is a consensus within the development effort that security
is important, external factors sometimes conspire against a good result. In a distributed
development organization, programmers sometimes do not wait for the security require-
ments engineers to finish their work before embarking on implementation of modules,
resulting in an end product with gaping security holes in spite of a committed security
effort [60]. In large European projects it is also sometimes seen that the individual
partners focus more on extending pre-existing tools (from previous projects), which im-
plies that any central security requirements effort is doomed to failure, since the various
partners already “know” what they are going to build, and do not “need” any additional
security requirements input. In contrast, most of the projects covered by the papers in
this thesis are smaller, more focused efforts where the security requirements generally
where elicited by the same group that would eventually implement the solution1. This
indicates to me that there is a need to focus more on security in agile development
processes, in such a way that “ordinary” developers are responsible for eliciting security
requirements for their own components [32]. We have made some small contributions in
this area, but there is clearly a need for more research on this topic.
1With the exception of the huge SESAR programme [29], and also the possible exception of the
OBAN project, where requirements and design of the Kerberos solution were performed by us, but
where we provided support to the developers later implementing our design.
27
4. SECURITY IS A PROCESS CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION
4 Security is a Process
In my thesis work for the Sivilingeniør degree at the Norwegian Institute of Technology,
I implemented what I believe to be the first version of the BSD File Transfer Protocol
application to include challenge-response authentication and encryption of file contents
[10]. Although reportedly used internally at the Australian Defence Force Academy for
some time, this implementation never saw wide use, something which I partly attribute
to the subsequent development of SSH and SSL – with a secure transport layer, the
need for communication security in each application is clearly reduced, if not eliminated
entirely.
The point of this is that while you are resting on your laurels, the battlefield changes,
and yesterday’s security solutions may no longer be valid. It is therefore never possible
to sit back secure [sic!] in the knowledge that you have achieved security; the only path
to security is through continual improvement.
Whereas the different papers included in this thesis all contribute to a whole as
illustrated in Figure 3.1, it is unlikely that they would ever be incorporated in a single
monolithic system. However, this is less important, since each individual result gradually
moves the state of the art a little further ahead, benefiting the community at large.
5 What is a Critical Information Infrastructure?
The US Department of Homeland Security [14] provides the following definition:
Critical infrastructure are the assets, systems, and networks, whether physi-
cal or virtual, so vital [. . . ] that their incapacitation or destruction would
have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination thereof.
The European Commission [16], on the other hand, states:
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are increasingly inter-
twined in our daily activities. Some of these ICT systems, services, networks
and infrastructures (in short, ICT infrastructures) form a vital part of Eu-
ropean economy and society, either providing essential goods and services
or constituting the underpinning platform of other critical infrastructures.
They are typically regarded as critical information infrastructures (CIIs) as
their disruption or destruction would have a serious impact on vital societal
functions.
Critical Information Infrastructures are thus Critical Infrastructures that rely wholly or
in part on Information Technology.
Offhand, it could be claimed that only two or three of the papers in this dissertation
are related to critical infrastructure (i.e., oil & gas and aviation), however it has become
clear to me that any hardware or software product might find itself as a component of
a critical infrastructure system, whether it was designed with this in mind or not. The
obvious example is the Windows-based personal computer platform, which is practically
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ubiquitous; e.g., Stuxnet [17, 50] targeted uranium-enrichment centrifuges in an Iranian
power plant through infecting the Windows-based engineering system that served as
the user interface to the process control equipment.
There are also other examples where, e.g., consumer-grade communication channels are
used for critical infrastructure applications; we have documented that advanced metering
infrastructures use IEEE 802.11-based mesh networking for collecting metering data, and
conventional General Packet Radio System (GPRS) for backhaul communication [77, 43].
Ad hoc networking has been proposed as a solution to communication needs in crisis
situation where the regular communications infrastructure has been incapacitated due
to natural disasters [62, 19], and it does not require a great leap of imagination to see
where the fast handover scheme described in Paper 2 and 3 [44, 66] could be integrated
into a scheme for using WiFi and WiMax as fallback for (e.g.) GPRS communication
in a Smart Grid scenario.
Smart Metering is an example of where critical infrastructure meets consumer electron-
ics. Various home automation applications have been devised in concert with a smart
meter, and while this potentially exposes consumers to new attacks, it also places a
critical infrastructure component (the smart meter) in a potentially hostile environment
where the attacker (the consumer) has full control over the physical installation. In this
context, being able to detect and deflect an attack without alerting the attacker may
be crucial, also in order to deploy physical countermeasures involving law enforcement
personnel before the attacker has a chance to do serious damage. The applicability of
the ISH-solution [35] may be even clearer in other critical infrastructure applications
such as banking; in Norway 88% of consumers use the internet to perform banking
operations [73], and an attack could potentially cripple the Norwegian society.
Software security is important for all software projects, and thus even more so for
critical information infrastructure systems. However, also in this case it is important to
note that the weak link in a critical infrastructure application often will not be those
components that are purpose-built, but rather the commodity computing devices and
software that support and extend them. I would therefore argue that improving the
security of general computing can have an even greater impact on Critical Information
Infrastructure security.
6 Empirical Research Contributions
The importance of empirical research is not something that was given undue attention
during my engineering education at the Norwegian Institute of Technology (NTH) at the
end of the 1980ies. NTH was deeply entrenched in the ideas later identified as Design
Science [22], which might be described (a little disrespectfully and over-simplified) as:
“Build something and then test if it works.” Real programmers don’t eat quiche [67],
and a computer/software engineer would rather stick to numbers and facts than having
to involve humans and “qualitative research”.
Unfortunately, by omitting the human element, we often find ourselves in a position
where we are building the wrong thing. This was a gradual process of awareness for
myself, which is reflected in the fact that there little or no empirical research in the
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earlier articles in this thesis. However, we can note the there are empirical contributions
from interviews and workshops in both SeSa [34] and IRMA [26] projects. Interestingly,
the IRMA project is also an example of how mundane situations can impact academic
plans: Just as IRMA was gearing up to extend the project by deploying the IRMA
method in a working production environment, the target organization announced that
it was merging with a major competitor. This merger soon proved to be such an
extensive process that all non-essential projects (such as ours would have been) were
put indefinitely on hold.
In general, it is always more convenient to conduct research that doesn’t involve
people. Any project that involves interviews, questionnaires, focus groups or any other
kind of stakeholder interaction needs to take real people’s schedules, availability, likes
and dislikes into account. Real people are typically also less interested in your research
than you are – even when they are generally positive, and when you can provide a
convincing argument for “what’s in it for them”, you always have to play second fiddle to
their “real job”. This implies last-minute cancellations due to more important meetings
and business travel, and potentially long delays in your carefully crafted project schedule.
In a recent project, we have experienced this yet again, and struggled to recruit
stakeholders to workshops held in central locations such as Brussels and London.
However, we did experience that when we invited stakeholders to local events, both
during working hours and after work, many people took the time to attend. It was clear,
however, that we needed to give them something – specifically, useful presentations that
they could learn something new from. If stakeholders feel they are wasting their time,
this leads to another form of stakeholder fatigue, and they will shy away the next time
they see your name on an invitation.
In cryptography circles, Kerckhoffs’ principle [48] has long been a maxim. In general
terms, what this principle says is that a cryptographic system should not rely on the
secrecy of its mechanism, but only on the secrecy of the key. Unfortunately, this
principle is poorly understood by many, resulting in on the one hand instances of
security through obscurity (where anyone with access to the inner workings of the system
can trivially break it), and on the other hand knee-jerk reactions to the effect that
“anything that concerns security mechanisms must be kept secret”. The latter can create
major obstacles for any empirical research effort in the security space.
7 Research Questions Revisited
The research questions presented in Section 3.1 map closely to the papers which have
been briefly presented in Chapter 3. In the following I will summarize the contributions
to each research question.
30
CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 7. RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED
7.1 How can handovers between wireless access points be
performed securely without incurring delays that affects
VoIP user experience?
The fast handover scheme using Kerberos tickets (Paper 2, Paper 3 [44, 66]) solves this
with a delay between 10 and 40 ms.
7.2 How can security functions be organized in a critical in-
frastructure network?
The security architecture for the OBAN system (Paper 1 [41]) and the good-practice
approach deployed in the Secure Safety project (Paper 7 [34]) approach this from two
different points of view. Furthermore, we have shown the importance of identifying
the assets in a software system (Paper 4 [40]) before specifying security requirements
(Paper 5 [29]), and elaborated on the difficulty of measuring the security of an existing
software application (Paper 6 [25]).
7.3 How can a system survive a successful attack without
alerting the attacker?
The ISH system (Paper 9 [35]) shows how dynamic deployment of honeypots can both
average an attack, and contribute to early warning and mitigation in other systems.
7.4 How can a successful attack on a critical infrastructure
system be mitigated by incident handling?
The IRMA method (Paper 8 [26]) documents how information security incidents can
be handled in an oil and gas environment, with a particular focus on learning from
information security incidents.
7.5 What is the threat posed by malware currently not de-
tectable by signature-based anti-malware systems?
Our experiment (Paper 10 [33]) showed that aggressive and uncritical internet behavior
will leave a user exposed to malware threats, even when using updated anti-malware
tools. Our two-week activity caused our five test computers to be infected with a total
of 124 unique malware samples undetectable at the time. This confirms that not only is
current signature-based anti-malware unable to protect against a targeted attack with
custom-built malware, but users who exhibit high-risk internet behavior will with high
probability suffer infection also from indiscriminately spread malware.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Further Work
Security is never a “fire and forget” concept1; security is a continuing process. Since the
only attainable goal is “good enough” security, this also implies that security is forever
a moving target: Security can only be achieved through continual improvement. In the
previous pages, I have presented a number of security solutions that were considered
appropriate at the time, but were never presumed to be the final solution to any of the
problems they tried to solve.
I am currently working in primarily three areas: Security in Cloud Computing
[69, 8, 28, 27, 82, 45, 75, 57, 7, 9, 81, 36, 83, 61, 6, 38], Security in Smart Grid
[56, 77, 43, 53] and Security in Air Traffic Management systems [29, 49]. Additionally, I
retain an interest in Software Security“for the rest of us” [25, 46, 47, 32, 60, 70, 78, 40, 76],
and I am particularly excited about a recent opportunity to employ the BSIMM
framework to survey the software security maturity in Norwegian Public Bodies.
Although one might argue that“the Cloud”is becoming more like critical infrastructure
for every day, the most straightforward continuation of my work in critical infrastructure
will be performed in the Smart Grid domain. Furthermore, I have recently been involved
in several projects related to security of process control systems in water and wastewater
distribution networks [39], an area which to the casual observer might seem less exciting
than the oil industry, but which clearly is an important part of critical infrastructure,
and which has its own set of interesting security problems.
1Although I have previously argued that it should perhaps be “forget and get fired”
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